The best step to ending the blockade is the invasion and overthrow of Hamas once and for all. That is not a guaranteed result of any invasion, and any invasion as necessary as it is would never get the support it deserves. Israel has not been given a choice vis a vis its war with Hamas. There is no buffer zone the country can make to protect Sderot, Ashkelon and Ashdod from rocket attacks from the strip – all those cities are within range from any position in the Strip.
Occupying the strip would be the next best option, but would put the country in a further diplomatic bind. International peacekeepers have failed to prevent the rearmament of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, and remain as useful as they were in the prelude to the Six Day War in 1967, when the President of Egypt Gamal Nasser demanded the UN force there abandon their positions so Egypt could establish a springboard position for invasion of Israel from within the Sinai.
What form of self-defense is legitimate here? Israel is being pushed against a wall when even its limited use of military power is considered illegitimate. The diplomatic pressure on the Israelis to end wars as soon as they begin – such as accusations of disproportionate use of force before evidence of such even presents itself – compels a mentality that Israel would have to use even heavier firepower in greater quantities in order to deter future attacks on Israelis – symmetric or asymmetric. In other words, rather than a careful campaign that can focus on tactical targets, Israel is given a time limit that encourages sloppiness and increases the likelihood of mistakes.
Israel has long faced irrational international pressure over its combat efforts – the Soviet Union cut off relations with Israel after the Six Day War, and the UN censured Israel’s use of force on that occasion (in the face of public threats by Arab leaders to annihilate the country) as well as following the Entebbe Raid in 1976.
The accusation that Israel’s siege mentality is unjustified, as has been repeated ad nauseum over the past week, is itself baseless. Israel has responded with heavy military operations in response to great threats to its citizens, and has consistently pocketed several victories – Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, I would argue the deterrence factor following the 2006 invasion of Lebanon, and the near-total lack of rockets fired from the Gaza Strip following Operation Cast Lead.
Yet, with every military operation, come some amount of diplomatic fallout be it based on propaganda or political considerations. The IDF was exonerated after an investigation of a massacre in Jenin – the casualty numbers cited by accusers were inflated 10 times the correct count and all casualties were combatants. Israel was accused of targeting civilians in 2006, when in fact Hezbollah has never been forthcoming about how many “combatants” died during the war. And of course, last year Turkey decided to consider its political opening in the Middle East by publicly using every opportunity possible to attack Israeli policies in order to earn favorable public opinion (never mind Turkey’s own stated policies of military occupation of the Kurds).
European pressure to immediately accuse Israel of war crimes before such evidence of them having occurred is available – notably the idea of disproportionate force – has diluted European credibility in Israel to absurd lows. The term was even used incorrectly on several occasions, as if using air power against inaccurate rockets was illegal. Any enemy target is legitimate in war. But European politicians’ description deliberately misleads, as if it required a state to act in self-defense in a tit-for-tat and any expanded campaign against hostile targets that went beyond, say, merely eliminating rocket launchers.
This combination of factors has forced Israel into a siege mentality. Perhaps my own perspective of the situation is worth a psychological analysis, but these are undeniable facts relating to Israel’s defense policies over the last 10 years – since the rebuff at Camp David.
This has become an issue about more than just the international community’s demands to compel Israeli withdrawals from hostile territory. More and more, the right wing in Israel is seeing its narrative reaffirmed as to the unfair treatment Israel’s defense policies have gotten. It is encouraging further self-reliance. feeding into the present cycle of military action and diplomatic fallout.
What this is leading to is not a breaking point for the Palestinians – as claimed by Mahmoud Abbas, or a breaking point for Turkey – which took its own initiative to downgrade ties with Israel and upgrade with Iran on its own. Israel feels that it has to further increase its military prowess. This is the mentality in the country, not necessarily the strategy that military brass will outline if any fundamental changes are to some to national defense strategy.
Israel will be wise to fix its reputation by changing many domestic policies and its attitude within the West Bank and vis a vis Gaza, as well as its diplomatic situation. But expect Israel to start preparing to move harder and faster than it ever has before. More and more, Israel will be forced to act in the dark, which means a jolt to Israel’s intelligence strategy and secret operations. Most of all, it will prepare itself to go beyond limited military confrontations in order to fully eliminate threats that put Israel in these diplomatic binds in the first place.