Archive for ‘Northern Cyprus’

April 21, 2012

Israel’s Navy Expanding to Defend Offshore Gas

by Gedalyah Reback

Israel has expanded its relationship with Greece for two reasons. The first is because Greece is the natural alternative to having an alliance with Turkey, which is falling apart. The second is Greece is the natural patron of Cyprus, the other country about to win big from natural gas fields discovered in the Mediterranean Sea. Israel is planning to develop several fields, so naturally they will want a strong relationship with the other country nearby, Cyprus. The fields are in the “territorial waters” of the two countries, that is the area of ocean or sea water that is within legal range of a country’s coastline.

But that also involves Lebanon. Lebanon is nowhere near as advanced as Israel in its ability to explore for mineral deposits offshore. But now that Israel has hit the jackpot, Lebanon is making claims that some of the fields are in Lebanese water. The maps would have to be manipulated to make that true, but that hasn’t stopped Hezbollah and the rest of the Lebanese government from making an issue out of it. Hezbollah added fuel to the fire, threatening Israel if it crossed into the ambiguously defined Lebanese waters. In kind, Israel promised it would defend its gas deposits with force.

There is teeth to the Israeli words while little to Hezbollah’s. Despite what little naval options Hezbollah or Lebanon would have, Israel is stacking up. The navy is negotiating with South Korea and Hyundai to buy a bunch of new frigates. Israel recently had a spat with South Korea’s military industry because Jerusalem chose to buy a squadron of training planes from Italy instead of the Koreans. Filling the need to bulk up the navy and stay on good terms with South Korea is like killing two birds with one stone. Some even want Israel to stock up on bigger sorts of ships like destroyers and cruisers.

Israel is also replacing its joint naval war games with the Turks by conducting new ones with the Greeks. Greece is a patron to tiny Cyprus, so any business or military affairs happening on the island resonate in Athens. Greece is equally involved in the cultivation of the natural gas deposits as Cyprus or Israel, so the Greek navy will be the first natural ally for the Israelis in the Mediterranean.

Cyprus might end up mediating between the Israelis and the Lebanese on a maritime border. Cyprus already has working agreements with both countries on exploration, but both could be undermined if either country cannot begin working offshore. Lebanon refuses to ratify its agreement with Cyprus until it gets clarity on its southern border, forcing Cyprus to get pro-active about solving the dispute. Israel and Lebanon are also beginning to cooperate in other ways on the waters of the Mediterranean Sea – blocking Palestinian activists from crossing into Israeli waters on Land Day and Nakba Day. There is room to settle the dispute, but it might have more to do with Hezbollah’s willingness to cook up an issue to fight about then actually taking a pragmatic approach to the issue.

Turkey is the big reason though to bulk up. Initially you’d think I’m talking about the Flotilla incident in 2010, when the Israeli navy boarded a ship and killed nine Turkish activists on their way to protest the blockade of Gaza. The reason to buy bigger boats has more to do with Turkey’s relations with Cyprus. Turkey has a tense relationship with Cyprus. In 1974, Turkey invade Cyprus and carved out the northern third of the island as a separate country for Turkish residents – Northern Cyprus. Only Turkey recognizes the country, and in September 2011 signed a joint exploration deal with the tiny country to search for gas off the Northern Cypriot shore.

Turkey has had fierce rhetoric since and its own naval maneuvers, rattling its sabers in the direction of the Greek, southern Cyprus working with the Israelis. In December, Turkey drove ships toward the fields claimed by Israel and the southern Cypriots and fired in the direction of the fields. Israel and Cyprus have asked for help from the US to keep the Turks back, but the tensions are hot as Turkey seeks to stake a claim for itself and its tiny Northern Cypriot neighbor. The International Crisis Group in the beginning of April accused Turkey of a series of provocations against southern Cyprus, and told Turkey to discipline itself.

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April 1, 2012

Outside Arabia: Greece, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Israel’s Strategy

by Gedalyah Reback

Month to month, there is some report about Turkey’s distaste for Israeli policy or the Jewish state getting cozy with one of Turkey’s immediate neighbors. Today was Israel’s latest military exercise with Greece. The exercise involves the United States Navy and is actually the replacement for the NATO-affiliated exercises Israel once joined that had a central presence by Turkey. Israel doesn’t have to go far to find some way to exploit the divide between Greece and Turkey.

There isn’t the sort of tension that led to Greek revolutions against the Ottoman Empire of the past, but the diplomatic differences are still there. Issues revolve around Turkey’s ally Northern Cyprus, and Greece’s ally (the southern) Republic of Cyprus.

But the more important story this week was about Azerbaijan. Israel’s government has gone out of its way the last 15 years to create a strong relationship with Iran’s secular neighbor. The article speculated Israel could use Azerbaijan either to stage rescue missions and “clean-up” crews for the aftermath of a strike on Iran, or even use it to launch the operation itself. Despite the heavy political implications and exposure to Azerbaijan’s security, the story’s reporting does broaden our general perspective of how versatile Israel’s strategy is.

There are a bunch of other countries that Israel has interest in. It doesn’t have to involve Iran. But these stories and more in the pipeline should wake up anyone studying the country. There’s slightly more to Israel’s military and foreign interests than just the United States, Iran and the Palestinians.

June 9, 2010

The Cyprus Model? (NYTimes Blog, "Evaluations")

by Gedalyah Reback

by Ross Douthat for the New York Times

The Cyprus Model?
June 8, 2010, 3:33 pm

David Frum argues that the relative stability of a politically-divided Cyprus, half Turkish and half Greek, offers a model for Israel and Palestine:

Despite the fuzzy legal status of the North — despite lingering angry feelings between Greeks and Turks — peace has in fact settled upon Cyprus.

There has been no major violence on the island since the mid-1970s. The economy on both sides of the line has grown handsomely in recent years. Barriers between the two sides — including physical barriers — have begun to open. Greek Cyprus belongs to the European Union and uses the euro; Turkish Cyprus does not. Greek Cyprus has a seat at the UN; Turkish Cyprus does not.

But if Turkish Cyprus does not have a legal existence as a country, it nonetheless exercises the functions of sovereignty. Turkish Cyprus keeps the peace on its side of the line: It tolerates no terrorist groups and shoots no rockets.

And over time, the two sides have approached closer and closer to mutual acceptance. Younger Cypriots seem increasingly bored by the ancient dispute. … Will the two sides ever ratify a formal peace? Who knows? And how much does it matter?

Frum’s column deserves to be read alongside my colleague Tom Friedman’s piece last week on the slow-but-steady institutional progress being made by Mahmoud Abbas’s quasi-government in the West Bank. Both make a plausible case for what might be called post-peace process optimism: The hope that if Israelis and Palestinians stop investing all of their energy into the dream of a final settlement — what Aaron David Miller provocatively calls “the false religion of Mideast peace” — they might be able to make a kind of organic progress, à la Cyprus, toward a world where a formal peace treaty is almost beside the point.

But to return to yesterday’s point, the Cyprus model depends on a much cleaner separation — indeed, a U.N.-monitored buffer zone — between the warring parties than seems imaginable in the Holy Land at the moment. And this, again, is the case for Israeli disentanglement from its occupied territories: So long as the current intertwinement endures, any incremental progress toward peace, prosperity and stability will remain a hostage to the politics of occupation. Just ask Salam Fayyad, the Palestinian Authority’s impressive prime minister, whose technocratic élan has helped midwife an economic revival in the West Bank — but who still feels the need, as Slate’s Michael Weiss points out, to play the rabble-rouser on the settlement issue:

If Fayyad’s stock has gone down in Israel, it’s because of his emergence as the public face of the settlement-boycott movement in the West Bank—a policy that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu calls “economic and political warfare” and settlers call “economic terrorism.” Fayyad has attended protests, which now average 40 per week, as well as various “bonfire” ceremonies, where settlement-made goods are incinerated. The Palestinian Authority has said that by the end of the year, all West Bankers employed in settlement industries must find alternative means of income. His most provocative measure so far was organizing the failed attempt to prevent Israel’s entry into the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, because he says it is keeping a single ledger for domestic and settlement accounts. Only the former, he insists, should make it eligible for inclusion.

Israeli admirers say that Fayyad is merely doing what any politician in the region has to do: indulging in the theatrics of “resistance” in order to maintain credibility with the people. Many Palestinians wonder at Fayyad’s true political motives; the settlement-boycott movement began at the grass-roots level and, depending on whom you talk to, the Palestinian Authority has either hijacked it in order to claim credit for the idea or infiltrated it in order to tame its more radical exponents and forestall a worst-case scenario: the outbreak of a third intifada. As one of Fayyad’s own officials recently told The Economist, that dreaded contingency is all too real, particularly beyond the well-patrolled cities of the West Bank.

When a Palestinian leader can govern, and state-build, without looking over his shoulder for an intifada, I’ll believe that Israel and Palestine are on their way to a Cyprus-style detente. Maybe Ariel Sharon may have had a plan to make that possible, but I’m pretty sure the current Israeli leadership doesn’t.

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